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我认同三个观点,即澳元将由于中国经济放缓而受到压力,上海及中国东南沿海的房价将有大幅下跌,全球通涨压力将减轻,澳洲加息压力随之消失。
对策:沽澳元,矿业类股票,买澳洲长债
Morgan Stanley's Stephen Roach believes the world should prepare for the increasing possibility of a meaningful slowdown of the Chinese economy. Here are the key points from Roach's May 23rd piece entitled "What if China Slows?":
Economic Growth
* Supply-side numbers remain strong.
* Re-acceleration of industrial output growth to 16.0% year-over-year (y-o-y) in April 2005.
* Chinese GDP growth trajectory held at 9.5% in Q1 2005.
* Momentum continues to be driven by surging Chinese exports.
* Industrial output for exports estimated to have risen 29.9% y-o-y in April.
* Chinese exports grew 32% y-o-y in April.
* Fixed investment grew 26% this year through April.
* While fixed investment growth is lower than the 40% comparisons of a year ago, they exceed the government’s official 16% growth target for the sector.
* Fixed investment sector on track to exceed 50% of Chinese GDP this year.
Demand Side Shows Discomforting Signs
* Evidence of a sharp slowdown in Chinese import growth.
* From Jan-April 2005 y-o-y import growth was 13.5% versus 36% in all of 2004.
* This has implications for the rest of the region, which provides China with capital equipment and intermediate inputs for its export businesses.
Chinese Import Growth Fuels Pan-Asian Exports
* 20% of total exports from Korea, Taiwan, and Japan go to China (Singapore - 10%).
* Slowdown in Chinese import growth is already affecting Asia.
* In Taiwan, export growth slipped to just 1.2% y-o-y in Q1 2005.
* Japan's exports showed a -0.8% q-o-q, annualized export decline in Q1 2005.
* Hong Kong (+3.5% y-o-y in March), Korea (+7.4% in Q1 2005), and Singapore (+6.2% in March for non-oil domestic exports).
* In all of the countries mentioned above, the latest export comparisons represent a sharp deceleration from gains six months ago, when the Chinese import boom was cresting.
China's Import Slowdown Affecting Commodity Inflation
* This reflects China’s dominant role in driving world demand for industrial materials.
* Morgan estimates that China accounted for 8% of global consumption of crude oil, 20% of aluminum, and 30-35% of steel, iron, and coal.
* Deceleration of Chinese imports has been accompanied by a sharp deceleration of non-oil commodity inflation.
* The Journal of Commerce composite index of industrial materials is now down 3% y-o-y through May 20. Peak increases of close to 35% in early 2004.
* Commodity prices are one of the best real-time gauges of the interplay between global supply and demand.
* Emergence of negative comparisons for industrial commodity prices could well be a good leading indicator of further weakness to come in Chinese industrial activity.
Efforts to Curb the Property Bubble
* China's recent restraints on both supply and demand could finally lead to a bursting of coastal China’s property bubble.
* This could also lead to a meaningful slowing of growth in fixed asset investment.
* Fixed asset investment accounted for 44% of total Chinese GDP in 2004.
* Fixed asset investment was still growing at a 26.5% y-o-y rate in April 2005.
* Like exports, fixed asset investment is also accounting for about 11 percentage points of annualized Chinese GDP growth.
* Every ten percentage points of slowing in residential property investment could knock about one percentage point off total Chinese GDP growth.
Chinese GDP Growth Risks
* Externally-imposed constraints on exports.
* Internally-imposed restraints on property investment.
Roach Believes China's Policymakers will be Cautious
* Could mean a delay on currency reform.
* China’s new export taxes on textile products suggests that it may prefer tax policy over revaluation in order to restrain exports.
* Despite China’s intentions to manage its export problems, the US, which accounts for about 33% of total Chinese exports, seems prepared to make changes themselves.
Key Deficiencies of China’s Growth Model
* Excess reliance on exports and fixed investment.
* With little private consumption, the Chinese economy is vulnerable to shortfalls in either of these sectors.
* Private consumption accounts for only 42% of China's GDP.
Conclusion
* Conceivable there could be a meaningful slowing of the Chinese economy.
* It is likely to be driven by China’s internal measures as well as by anti-China actions.
* If that occurs, China’s Asian supply chain should be especially hard hit.
* A China slowdown could also result in further downward pressures on commodity prices of oil and non-oil industrial materials.
* Could also temper inflationary expectations embedded in global bond markets.
* If there is a delay in revaluation, pressure on the US dollar could be tempered.
Why Now
* New and more difficult challenges today than before.
* Property bubble is an increasingly worrisome source of internal instability.
* The currency-export nexus has become an increasingly intractable source of external instability.
* China faces growing pressures to make change.
According to Roach:
....This time, it will be much tougher for China to avoid a meaningful slowdown. It’s time for the rest of the world to prepare for just such a possibility. |
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