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hgaox 发表于 2017-8-14 22:30 
我很怀疑你此段对大法官判词的翻译
美国政与教 法律与宗教是分离的 很难相信联邦最高法院的判词会引用宗 ...
直接援引圣经是不可能的,一般称基督教徒为"religion believers".
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf
ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
Federal courts are blunt instruments when it comes to
creating rights. They have constitutional power only to
resolve concrete cases or controversies; they do not have
the flexibility of legislatures to address concerns of parties
not before the court or to anticipate problems that may
arise from the exercise of a new right. Today’s decision,
for example, creates serious questions about religious
liberty. Many good and decent people oppose same-sex
marriage as a tenet of faith, and their freedom to exercise
religion is—unlike the right imagined by the majority—
actually spelled out in the Constitution. Amdt. 1.
Respect for sincere religious conviction has led voters
and legislators in every State that has adopted same-sex
marriage democratically to include accommodations for
religious practice. The majority’s decision imposing samesex
marriage cannot, of course, create any such accommodations.
The majority graciously suggests that religious
believers may continue to “advocate” and “teach” their
views of marriage. Ante, at 27. The First Amendment
guarantees, however, the freedom to “exercise” religion.
Ominously, that is not a word the majority uses.
。。。。
One immediate question invited by the majority’s position
is whether States may retain the definition of marriage
as a union of two people. Cf. Brown v. Buhman, 947
F. Supp. 2d 1170 (Utah 2013), appeal pending, No. 14-
4117 (CA10). Although the majority randomly inserts the
adjective “two” in various places, it offers no reason at all
why the two-person element of the core definition of marriage
may be preserved while the man-woman element
may not. Indeed, from the standpoint of history and tradition,
a leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage
is much greater than one from a two-person union to
plural unions, which have deep roots in some cultures
around the world. If the majority is willing to take the big
leap, it is hard to see how it can say no to the shorter one.
It is striking how much of the majority’s reasoning
would apply with equal force to the claim of a fundamental
right to plural marriage. If “[t]here is dignity in the bond
between two men or two women who seek to marry and in
their autonomy to make such profound choices,” ante, at
13, why would there be any less dignity in the bond between
three people who, in exercising their autonomy,
seek to make the profound choice to marry? If a same-sex
couple has the constitutional right to marry because their
children would otherwise “suffer the stigma of knowing
their families are somehow lesser,” ante, at 15, why
wouldn’t the same reasoning apply to a family of three or
more persons raising children? If not having the opportunity
to marry “serves to disrespect and subordinate” gay
and lesbian couples, why wouldn’t the same “imposition of
this disability,” ante, at 22, serve to disrespect and subordinate
people who find fulfillment in polyamorous relationships?
See Bennett, Polyamory: The Next Sexual
Revolution? Newsweek, July 28, 2009 (estimating 500,000
polyamorous families in the United States); Li, Married
Lesbian “Throuple” Expecting First Child, N. Y. Post, Apr.
23, 2014; Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The Case for
a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage, 64 Emory L. J.
1977 (2015). |
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