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'以上是否正确？请给予指示‘
ZT
SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CABLE Nº 21756
Copy Nº 1 to Cde. Stalin
Nº 2 to Cde. Stalin
from [BEIJING] received 1500 13 July 1951
Copy Nº 2
[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming Nº 545/2384/shs 13 July 1951]
SERIES "G"
T
to Cde. FILIPPOV Cde. Filippov!
Regarding the ceasefire negotiations in Korea, during two meetings the Americans deliberately raised the issue of the presence of correspondents at the conference in order to cause a recess during the conference for the purpose of stalling for time, creating public opinion, and finding out our plans. However this was a stupid venture which was easy to expose.
We will vigorously insist that no correspondents or representatives of the press can be allowed south of Kaesong by unilateral coercive action without the agreement of both sides.
If the Americans arrive in a day or two to conduct negotiations then we are thinking that after the negotiations resume of first adopting the agenda after which allowing an equal number of correspondents of both sides to come to the area of Kaesong but not letting them into the conference room. If the Americans insolently violate the principles of agreement by both sides and cannot arrive without correspondents then we will hold to our decision no matter what and not retreat one step.
As regards the fight over the issue of the agenda, in his statement at the first meeting Cde. Nam Il offered three proposals about a cessation of hostilities and thereby our side took the initiative. Therefore, after the resumption of the negotiations as a result of a further detailed analysis and struggle we want to propose the following general points of the agenda:
1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. First of all, adopt a decision about a military boundary between both sides and the creation of a buffer zone in order to implement a ceasefire and institute an armistice in Korea.
3. Adopt a decision about a withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities in Korea.
4. Specific measures to implement a cessation of hostilities, an armistice, and observation.
5. Measures regarding prisoners after a cessation of hostilities.
The agreement of the Americans to discuss the point about the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea needs to be sought in the above agenda. We can agree to it on the condition that the point about the creation of a specific boundary along the 38th parallel is not included in the agenda but this point is left until discussion of specific issues about
the agenda. At the same time as this the general issue about observation is included in the fourth point of the agenda in order that other specific issues can be added during the discussion of it.
If the Americans reject the inclusion of the point about the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea in the agenda then we will insist on the agenda of the five points which we previously proposed without change. Cde. Kim Il Sung let Cde. Le Kenong know that if there is agreement between both sides about the withdrawal of their troops from the 38th parallel then the issue of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea can be deferred.
However, based on the overall situation we think that it is necessary to insist on the 38th parallel and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and it is necessary to indicate the general meaning only in the wording of these issues but it is necessary to resolve the issue of the 38th parallel in the course of the discussion of the substance of the issues.
As regards the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea this can be done in separate stages.
The implementation of observation can be entrusted to neutral countries which did not participate in the war but the delegations of both sides to conduct negotiations should only perform the task concerning a cessation of hostilities.
As regards the issue of an exchange of refugees, as a result of study Cde. Kim Il Sung came to the conclusion that it disadvantageous for North Korea and therefore this issue was not in the agenda.
Is all the above correct?
Please send your instructions after studying [the above].
At the present time our troops are as before waging an intense battle with the enemy and preparing to conduct military operations for several months if the negotiations collapse in order to inflict great losses on the enemy in manpower and make a turnabout in the war in our favor.
MAO ZEDONG
Nº 3511
13 July
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Deciphered by Sudev 1615 13 July
Printed by Kornyushina 1645 13 July Nº 1675
Four copies printed. Copies Nº 3 and 4 to file
Verified: SECTION CHIEF
COLONEL [signature] (Makarov)
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