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The Roots of Chinese Nationalism
By EMILY PARKER
April 1, 2008; Page A17
The Chinese media decry violent Tibetan rioters; the West criticizes the Chinese crackdown. The Western press describes Chinese censorship; Chinese netizens slam Western media bias. A Chinese official calls the Dalai Lama a "political exile bent on engaging in activities aimed at splitting the motherland," while in the West he is described as a man of "peace" and "reconciliation." Americans and Europeans debate boycotting the Olympics to protest China's human-rights record; Chinese commentary describes Western arrogance toward a "developing country that is going to host the games."
Are we all living on the same planet?
It may be tempting to write off these Chinese nationalist attitudes as the results of state propaganda. And Beijing is certainly fanning the flames, at least for now. But as Chinese outrage explodes on the Web and among Chinese abroad, it's clear that Chinese nationalism is not just coming from the top down. It's not hard to find a Chinese person who expresses a "nationalist" view -- that Tibet is part of China, or that the Western media is biased -- but is also a vehement critic of the Communist Party. In some cases, nationalists have accused Beijing of not defending Chinese interests strongly enough.
So what does it mean to love China? And who decides, the Communist Party or the Chinese people themselves?
Meanwhile, those outside the country are asking their own questions. Perhaps what they want to know most is this: Will China's "love of country" (aiguozhuyi) somehow amount to hostility toward us? There have been several moments over the past decade when the short answer to this question, particularly where Americans and Japanese were concerned, appeared to be "yes."
One of the more dramatic outbursts took place in 1999, when NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese people. Many Chinese refused to believe fervent U.S. pleas that the bombing was a tragic accident, and tens of thousands took to the streets, with some throwing bricks and Molotov cocktails. U.S. Ambassador Jim Sasser was trapped in the American embassy for days as demonstrators pelted the building with stones.
In 2005, thousands of Chinese people took to the streets again, this time in reaction to Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The emotional, occasionally violent demonstrations were also protests against what many Chinese felt was Japan's failure to address the past -- including textbooks that whitewashed Japan's historical atrocities and then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to Japan's Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are enshrined.
These expressions of outrage were rooted in the perception that China was victimized by a foreign country. This idea of a wounded, defeated nation has deep roots in education and propaganda. In "China's New Nationalism," Peter Gries discusses how the narrative of China's "century of humiliation" has framed its interactions with the West. This narrative starts, he says, with China's defeat in the First Opium War and the British acquisition of Hong Kong in 1842, includes unequal treaties with the British and the Japanese in the 19th century, and continues with the "War of Resistance" against Japan in the 1930s and 1940s.
Running through this narrative is a potent streak of pride and indignation, and these emotions bleed into the business sphere. American and Japanese companies have learned the perils of appearing to treat China as an "inferior" nation. In 2004, Nike ran an ad on the mainland that featured American basketball star LeBron James battling, and defeating, Chinese symbols such as dragons and a kung-fu master.
Memo to Nike: If you run this kind of ad in China, the dragons better win. A brouhaha erupted, Chinese "national dignity" was wounded, and the Nike ad was banned. In 2005, a McDonald's television ad that showed a Chinese man begging for a discount was taken off the air, apparently because it was too humiliating.
A year before the Nike incident, Toyota ended up pulling and formally apologizing for advertisements featuring stone lions bowing to a Prado SUV. The issue was that lions, ancient symbols of Chinese power, were bowing to a Japanese product. Several years before that, some Chinese accused Toshiba of treating them as inferior because, following accusations of a laptop defect, the company compensated U.S. consumers but not their Chinese counterparts. Toshiba sales saw a steep drop on the Chinese marketplace.
These nationalist outbursts may have been influenced by years of propaganda, but they are not always dictated from the top. In fact, the widespread popularity of the Internet is allowing the people to influence the state media. A Chinese journalist who worked for CCTV, a major state media outlet, explained to me how this works. The journalist, who requested that he not be named, described his own experience covering Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council. An Internet petition opposing the bid reportedly obtained over 40 million signatures.
Public opinion may have played a decisive role in determining the state media reporting, not the other way around. "After the reactions on the Internet, the government changed, so we had to change. We had to report every day on how these efforts [to gain a seat on the Security Council] were going. Before this era, government could act unilaterally. Now, when something happens on the Internet, the government has to change policy."
As Beijing has tried to forge friendlier relations with Japan, public patriotism has threatened to get in the way. In 2004, the Chinese authorities shut down the popular Patriots' Alliance Web site founded two years earlier. The site had criticized Japan, the U.S., and occasionally the Chinese government for being too weak. It apparently crossed the line after launching an online petition protesting the Railways Ministry's decision to award contracts to Japanese companies. The petition obtained over 67,000 online signatures in under 24 hours.
Chinese outrage over Tibet could again put Beijing in a tough position. Stoking popular nationalism may have once been a convenient way to shore up faith in the party, but a public spewing rhetoric about the West bullying China has no place in a "One World, One Dream"-themed Olympic Games. The Olympics will provide a window into China's self-image and global ambitions, and one imagines that Beijing will not want to show the world a face that is contorted with anger.
Many Chinese might tell you that one particularly proud moment in recent history was in August 1984, a mere six years after Deng Xiaoping opened China's doors to the world. The moment was the Los Angeles Olympic Games, where China took home 15 gold medals. For a country that had once been called "the sick man of Asia," this was a truly historic moment. China has come a long way since.
Let's hope the Beijing Olympics will pave the way for a new aiguozhuyi -- one that reflects a confident nation whose patriotism is dictated neither by resentment nor by the Communist Party. Let the games begin.
Ms. Parker is an assistant editorial features editor at The Wall Street Journal. Her chapter on Chinese nationalism will appear in "China's Great Leap: The Beijing Games and Olympian Human Rights Challenges," (Seven Stories Press, May 2008). |
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澳洲炊饭指南——3月12日村嶋孟技巧大公开 (2015-3-9) Sharpening 
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